We apply Simon's algorithm to the miss-in-the-middle technique and propose a quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials of a general block cipher. We prove that, under certain assumption on the block cipher, the differentials output by the quantum algorithm are key-independent impossible differentials of the block cipher with a overwhelming probability. Moreover, we demonstrate that if the traditional miss-in-the-middle attack works for the block cipher, the proposed quantum algorithm will always work as well. By contrast, the quantum version of miss-in-the-middle technique proposed in this paper to some extent compensates for the disadvantages of traditional miss-in-the-middle technique that the successful probability decreases greatly with the increase of the number of rounds.
Introduction
In recent years, Simon's algorithm [1] has been widely used for cryptanalysis of symmetric ciphers. For instance, Kuwakado and Morri constructed a quantum distinguisher for 3-round Feistel scheme by using Simon's algorithm [2] . Afterwards, they use Simon's to recover the key of Even-Mansour scheme [3] . Santoli and Schaffiner latter extend the result in [2] and propose a quantum algorithm to forge tags of CBC-MAC scheme [4] . In [5] , Kaplan et al. also use Simon's algorithm to attack symmetric cryptosystems, including PMAC, CLOC and so on. Roetteler and Steinwandt apply Simon's algorithm to related-key attack [6] . Afterwards, Hosoyamada and Aoki use Simon's algorithm to extract the key of two-round Even-Mansour scheme [7] . In this paper, we apply Simon's algorithm to the miss-in-themiddle technique, and propose a quantum algorithm for finding impossible differentials of block ciphers.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly discuss the notations and definitions used in this paper. For any multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , a vector a ∈ {0, 1} n is called a linear structure of F if, there exists a vector b ∈ {0, 1} m such that
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-or. When b is equal to the m-dimensional zero vector 0 m , a is called a period of F .
Simon's algorithm
Simon's algorithm was proposed in 1994 [1] . It solves the following problem: given a function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m with the promise that there exists a vector s ∈ {0, 1} n such that [F (x) = F (y)] ⇔ [x ⊕ y ∈ {0 n , s}], ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , find the period s. Any function having such a period s is called satisfying Simon's promise. For any classical algorithm, Ω(2 n/2 ) classical queries to F are needed to find s [8] , while Simon's algorithm only needs O(n) quantum queries to F . With the access to a quantum oracle which computes f in superposition, Simon's algorithm repeats the following steps:
1. Prepare a n + m-qubits initial state |0 |0 , then perform the Hadamard transform H ⊗n on the first register, giving 1 √ 2 n x∈{0,1} n |x |0 .
Quantum query to F results in the state
3. Measure the second register in the computational basis, then get a value F (z) and the first register is collapsed to the state:
4. Apply the Hadamard transform H ⊗n to the first register again, giving:
5. Measure the above state in the computational basis. Since any vector y satisfying y · s = 1 have amplitude 0, the measurement always yields a random y such that y · s = 0.
Repeating the above steps for O(n) times gives n − 1 independent vectors orthogonal to s, then one can recover s efficiently by basic linear algebra. Running Simon's algorithm in F needs n + m qubits and O(2n 2 + n|F | Q ) universal gates, where |F | Q denotes the amount of universal gates required for executing the unitary operator:
3. Extended application scenario of Simon's algorithm
Simon's algorithm with multiple periods
In order to use Simon's algorithm to the miss-in-the-middle attack, we need to deal with the scenario where the given function may have multiple periods. Consider an arbitrary multi-output Boolean function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m . It is easy to see that all periods of F constitute a subspace of ndimensional linear space over F 2 . Let S F be the subspace constructed by the periods of F and s 1 , s 2 · · · , s t denotes a basis of S F . That is, S F = span{s 1 , · · · , s t }. If for any x, y ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds that
we say that F satisfies the generalized Simon's promise. The following lemma shows that Simon's algorithm still works even if the given function only satisfies the generalized Simon's promise. Proof. Since F satisfies the generalized Simon's promise, step 3 of Simon's algorithm results in a value F (z), and the first register is collapsed to the state:
After applying Hadamard transform H ⊗n like in step 4, the resulting state is:
Thus, the measurement always yields a random y such that y · s i = 0, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , t. Since s 1 , s 2 · · · , s t denotes a basis of S F , we have y ∈ S ⊥ F .
Repeating the above steps 1-5 for O(n) times, one is expected to obtain n − k independent vectors orthogonal to the period space S F . By solving the corresponding system of linear equations, one is able to efficiently determine the subspace S F , which is the of the solution space of the system of linear equations.
Simon's algorithm with unwanted collisions
Now we consider the more general situation, where F still has a nontrivial period space S F , but besides the periods, F might have other collisions at some points. That is, there may exist two points x and y such that F (x) = F (y), but x⊕y / ∈ S F . If there are too many such collisions, Simon's algorithm may not be able to solve the period space of F efficiently. However, if the number of collisions can be limited properly, the algorithm is still feasible. To illustrate this, we define the following parameter:
where
n , representing the probability that F (x) = F (x + a) when x is chosen randomly and uniformly from {0, 1}
n . The parameter ε(F ) measures how far F is from satisfying the generalized Simon's promise. The following theorem gives the relation between this parameter and the successful probability of Simon's algorithm.
m is a multiple-output Boolean function with period space S F . If running Simon's algorithm on F with cn queries resulting in cn measurement outputs u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u cn , and S is the solution space of the system of linear equations
Proof. We first prove that S F ⊆ S. Let s 1 , s 2 · · · , s t denote a basis of S F . Suppose the measurement of step 3 in Simon's algorithm gives a value
, F may have other collisions at the value F (z). Suppose a is such a collision. That is,
Thus, a⊕ t j=1 b j s j also yields a collision of F at the point z. Since s 1 , · · · , s t is a basis of the subspace S F , for any two unequal collisions a 1 , a 2 of F at the point z, the sets
either have no intersection or are completely equal. Therefore, the step 3 of Simon's algorithm causes the first register to collapse into a state in the following form:
After applying Hadamard transform H ⊗n like in step 4, the state in the first register is:
Thus, the measurement always yields a random y such that y · s i = 0, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , t, which means that s 1 , s 2 · · · , s t are in the solution space S. Since s 1 , · · · , s t is a basis of S F , we have S F ⊆ S. Then we prove that the probability that S F S is at most 2(
) c n . We need the following lemma, which is proved in [5] .
For any x, it satisfies
The probability that S F S is equal to
Now we compute Pr[u 1 · a = 0]. If one waits until the last step before measuring the both registers in Simon's algorithm, the final state before the measurement can be decomposed into:
Thus the probability that measurement yields u such that u · a = 0 is
Then according to Eq.(1) and Eq.(2), the conclusion holds.
According to Theorem 1, as long as c is not less than ⌈ln 2/ ln 2 1+p 0 ⌉, the solution space S is equal to the period space S F except for a negligible probability.
Using Simon's algorithm to find linear structures
Still consider a multiple-output Boolean function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m . We define the following function
If a is a linear of F , then there exist b such that F (x ⊕ a) ⊕ F (x) = b for all x. We call vector (a, b) a linear structure pair of F . The linear structure of F does not constitute a subspace because it is not closed under addition over F n 2 . However, all linear structure pair of F constitute a subspace of ndimensional linear space over F 2 . For any two linear structure pairs (
Thus, the set of linear structure pairs of F closed under addition. We call the subspace constituted by all linear structure pairs of F the linear structure space of F , denoted L F . Note that (a, b) is a linear structure pair of F if and only if (a, b) is a period of W . Therefore, the linear structure space L F of F is actually the period space S W of W .
According to Theorem 1, we can use Simon's algorithm to find the period space of a Boolean function. Thus, we can obtain the linear structure space of F by applying Simon's algorithm on W . Based on this idea, we proposed the following algorithm for finding all linear structure pairs of a given Boolean function.
Algorithm FindStru
Input: c is constant chosen by the attacker. The quantum oracle access of a Boolean function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m is given. output: A basis of the linear structure space L F of F .
1. Define the function W (x, y) = F (x) ⊕ y as Eq.(3). Since the quantum oracle of F is given, the oracle of W is accessible. 2. Run Simon's algorithm on W with c(n + m) queries to get c(n + m) measurement results u 1 , · · · , u c(n+m) ∈ {0, 1} n+m . Solve the system of linear equations
} is the system of fundamental solutions of above equations, then output the set
To demonstrate the validity of Algorithm FindStru, we consider the parameter ε(W ). By the definition of W , we have
For any Boolean function F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m , we define new parameter
To some exten, this parameter quantifies the distance of the linear structure pairs of F to other vectors in {0, 1} n+m . According to Theorem 1 and the fact that S W = L F , the smaller δ(F ) is, the greater the probability of Algorithm 2 successfully finding the linear structure space of F . Specifically, we have the following theorem:
m is a multiple-output Boolean function with linear structure space L F . If running Algorithm FindStru on F with c(n + m) queries outputs { (a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 
Quantum miss-in-the middle attack
The miss-in-the-middle technique is was proposed Biham, Biryukov, and Shamir [9] . It is generally applied to impossible differential cryptanalysis in classical cryptanalysis. The basic idea is that one finds two events that propagate half way through the cipher top and bottom with certainty, but which do not match in the middle. This results in an impossible differential.
Suppose E is a r-round block cipher with blocksize of n. Let F be the first r − 1 rounds of E, and K be the key space of F , i.e. the subkey space of the first r − 1 rounds of E. The inputs of F includes a key in K and a plaintext x ∈ {0, 1} n . Fixing a specific key k ∈ K, the action of F on x is denoted by
′ is the input difference and ∆y = y ⊕ y ′ is the output difference. The pair (∆x, ∆y) is called a differential of F k . (∆x, ∆y) it is called an impossible differential of F k if it holds that
n .
Key-independent probability-1 differential is defined similarly. When executing an impossible differential cryptanalysis, the attacker first needs to find some impossible differential (∆x, ∆y) of F k , and then sieve the subkey of the last round using the found impossible differential. Since the actually used key k is private, the attacker cannot access the F k but only F . Therefore, in classical impossible cryptanalysis, the attacker analyze the properties of F and tries to find key-independent impossible differentials of F , which is defined as following:
n is a cipher with key space K. (∆x, ∆y) it is called an key-independent impossible differential of F if, for any k ∈ K, any x ∈ {0, 1} n , it holds that
In the quantum computing scenario, the attacker also cannot access quantum oracle of F k since he does not know the private key k. However, the attacker can make quantum query to the encryption function F and tries to find key-independent impossible differential of F like in classical scenario. The miss-in-the-middle technique finds key-independent impossible differentials by connecting two unmatched probability-1 differential paths. Specifically, for any v ∈ {1, · · · , r − 2}, we divide F into two parts:
n corresponds to the last r − 1 − v rounds, and If (∆x 1 , ∆y 1 ) and (∆x 2 , ∆y 2 ) are key-independent probability-1 differentials ofF (v) and (F (v) ) −1 , respectively, and ∆y 1 = ∆y 2 , then (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 ) will be an key-independent impossible differential of F . Therefore, the miss-in-the-middle technique transforms the task of finding keyindependent impossible differentials into the task of finding key-independent probability-1 differentials.
Quantum algorithm for finding probability-1 differentials
Note that [(∆x, ∆y) is a key-independent probability-1 differential of
Thus, when given a cipher F with key space K, we can apply Algorithm FindStru on F to find its key-independent probability-1 differentials. The only problem is that, when applying Algorithm FindStru on F , we hope that the linear structure pair ((∆k, ∆x), ∆y) output by it satisfies that ∆k = 0 m , where segment ∆k corresponds to the difference of key bits. Thus a minor modification is needed when applying Algorithm FindStru. Suppose K = {0, 1} m , the algorithm for finding key-independent probability-1 differentials is as following:
Input: c is constant chosen by the attacker.
n is a cipher with key space K = {0, 1} m . The quantum oracle access of F is given. output: Key-independent probability-1 differentials of F . 1. Define the function
Since the quantum oracle of F is given, the oracle of W is accessible. 2. Run Simon's algorithm on W with c(2n + m) queries to get c(2n + m) measurement results u 1 , · · · , u c(2n+m) ∈ {0, 1} 2n+m . Solve the system of linear equations
The following theorem shows that, except for a negligible probability, L is the set of all key-independent probability-1 differentials of F .
n is a cipher with key
L contains all key-independent probability-1 differentials of F . If δ(F ) ≤ p 0 < 1 for some constant p 0 , then the probability that L contains other vectors that are not key-independent probability-1 differential of F is at most 2(
Proof. Note that (a, b) is a solution of
E or the reduced version F k with right key. (The attacker does need classical queries to the whole block cipher E in the key-recovery phase.) That is because the quantum oracle of F can be construct by the attacker himself using the public knowledge of F . Our attack does not require the ability to query the encryption function in superposition states.
Analysis of the algorithm
In this subsection, we analyze the validity and complexity of Algorithm FindImDiff. To justify the validity of Algorithm FindImDiff, we define the following parameter:
) are defined as in Eq.(4). According to Theorem 3, we have following theorem.
n is a cipher with key space K = {0, 1} m , andδ(F ) ≤ p 0 < 1 for some constant p 0 . If running Algorithm FindIm1Diff on F with 2c(r − 2)(2n + m) queries outputs H, then the probability that H contains the vectors that are not key-independent impossible differential of F is at most 2 2(
Theorem 4 shows that except for a negligible probability, every vectors in H is an key-independent impossible differential of F . In fact, as long as F has a key-independent impossible differential (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 ) that is connected by two unmatched probability-1 differentials, then there must be δy 1 , ∆y 2 such that ∆y 1 = ∆y 1 , and (∆x 1 , ∆y 1 ) and (∆x 2 , ∆y 2 ) are key-independent probability-1 differentials ofF (v) and (F (v) ) −1 respectively for some v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , r − 2}. According to Theorem 3, (∆x 1 , ∆y 1 ) must be in spanA (v) , and (∆x 2 , ∆y 2 ) must be in spanB (v) . Thus (∆x 1 , ∆x 2 ) must be in H. Therefore, any nontrivial key-independent impossible differential of F that are connected by two unmatched probability-1 differentials can be find by Algorithm FindIm1Diff. Therefore, in some degree, we can say that our quantum miss-in-the-middle technique always works for the block cipher if the classical miss-in-the-middle technique works for it.
we compare Algorithm FindIm1Diff with classical miss-in-the-middle technique. The miss-in-the-middle technique requires to find two unmatched probability-1 differentials. In classical cryptanalysis, the attacker looks for probability-1 differentials always by searching for probability-1 differential characteristics. Since the probability of differential characteristics generally decrease greatly as the increase of the number of rounds, finding probability-1 differential characteristics becomes more and more difficult when the number of rounds increases. However, Algorithm FindIm1Diff treatsF (v) andF (v) as a whole and cares only the input and output differences at their both ends. Algorithm FindIm1Diff suffers from smaller effect of the increase of the number of rounds, compared with the conventional miss-in-the-middle technique.
To analyze the complexity of Algorithm FindIm1Diff, suppose K
